In 1996, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act, which provides broad immunity to websites from vicarious liability for the content produced by its users. Despite this broad immunity, a website will be liable for its user's content when it is deemed to be an "information content provider" itself. In 2008, in
INTRODUCTION
Walking around Yawkey Way near Fenway Park, an observer will hear "buying tickets, selling tickets?" along with the cries of the sausage and gameday program vendors. 1 In open disregard for rarely enforced anti-scalping laws, brokers resell tickets, creating a secondary market that is now a five billion dollar industry.
2 Traditionally, brokers meander through the crowds attempting to profit off the economics of supply and demand.
3 Increasingly, however, these on-site brokers are struggling to compete with the lower information costs and absence of geographic constraints on the Internet. Rovell, Inflation in Red Sox Nation, ESPN (Oct. 11, 2003) , http://espn.go.com/page2/s/ rovell/031013.html [perma.cc/V7SB-PHX4] (describing the task of scalping Red Sox tickets on game day).
2 Eric Schroeder et al., A Brief Overview on Ticket Scalping Laws, Secondary Ticket Markets, and the StubHub Effect, 30 ENT. & SPORTS L. 1, 26 (2012) ; Rovell, supra note 1. 3 See Mays, supra note 1; Rovell, supra note 1. 4 See John George, That's the Ticket, PHILA. BUS. J. (Dec. 20, 2013) , http://www.bizjournals. com/philadelphia/print-edition/2013/12/20/thats-the-ticket.html [perma.cc/ZTT3-SDBY] (describing the effect of the Internet on the offline marketplace); Joe Nocera, Scalpers Are Arbitragers of the Arena, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 18, 2008) , http://www.nytimes.com/2008/01/18/business/worldbusiness/ Through peer-to-peer marketplaces, such as StubHub, buyers and sellers now have access to the secondary ticket market without having to leave their living rooms.
5 StubHub does not buy or sell tickets itself but simply connects buyers and sellers, charging a service fee. 6 As the leader in the online secondary ticket market, StubHub generated $500 million in revenue in 2013, with $3 billion worth of tickets sold on its site.
7 By providing tools like historical pricing data, virtual seating maps, and seamless payment, StubHub offers an experience that is unlike the traditional on-site marketplace. 8 With no maximum or minimum price restraints, StubHub lets the economics of supply and demand run their course.
9 For high-profile events, like the Super Bowl, demand greatly exceeds supply, resulting in ticket prices on the secondary market more than ten times their face value. 10 The imbalance of supply and demand can be affected by a number of factors, including the weather, the opponent, or the potential for a record-breaking moment.
11 Con- BLOOMBERG (Feb. 19, 2015, 6:48 PM) , http:// www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2015-02-19/stubhub-faces-pressure-from-ticketmaster-and-ebayits-own-parent [perma.cc/CA3Z-X5P6]. 8 See Cassidy, supra note 6 (describing StubHub's interface and processes); Satariano, supra note 7. 9 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic economic tenets of supply and demand); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing dynamic pricing with the CEO of StubHub). 10 See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26; Jesse Lawrence, Welcome to the Subprime Super Bowl Ticket Crisis, DAILY BEAST (Jan. 29, 2015) , http://www.thedailybeast.com/articles/2015/01/29/thesame-thing-that-ruined-the-housing-market-is-now-ruining-the-super-bowl.html [perma.cc/FU8U-5UDU] (detailing the events that led to the most expensive Super Bowl in history); Rovell, supra note 1; Darren Rovell, SB XLIX Tickets Priciest in History, ESPN (Feb. 1, 2015, 5:02 PM) , http://espn. go.com/nfl/playoffs/2014/story/_/id/12263047/super-bowl-xlix-tickets-most-expensive-game-history [perma.cc/SW39-K2HC] (explaining StubHub's role in the Super Bowl with the highest priced tickets ever seen).
11 See Brandon Formby, Novelty of First College Football Playoff Championship Isn't Driving Ticket Demand, DALL. MORNING NEWS (Jan. 7, 2015) , http://sportsday.dallasnews.com/collegesports/collegesheadlines/2015/01/06/novelty-of-first-college-football-playoff-championship-isn-tdriving-ticket-demand [perma.cc/MX5B-JPFE] (describing the influence of factors like travel and instate interest on ticket prices); Rovell, supra note 6 (discussing the impact of supply and demand on the secondary ticket market). For example, shortly after Derek Jeter announced he would be retiring at defending claims for vicarious liability under the Communications Decency Act ("CDA" or "the Act"), but there has been uncertainty as it pertains to StubHub. 19 The CDA gives a website immunity from vicarious liability for the actions of its users, unless the website is responsible "in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of the information that is the focus of the lawsuit. 20 Courts have split on how to define "development." 21 In 2008, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals proposed a now popular definition, which denies a website immunity if it "materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness" of the information. 22 When this test has been applied to StubHub, however, courts have reached different conclusions as to StubHub's liability for its users' actions. 23 This Note argues that a new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity in applying CDA immunity, in line with Congress's test. 24 Part I discusses the CDA, the courts' diverging interpretations of its key terms, and StubHub's reliance on immunity. 25 Part II examines the conflicting opinions on StubHub's liability and the threat to other peer-to-peer marketplaces. 26 Part III argues that a new test is needed and proposes a clearer test for CDA immunity.
I. SECTION 230 OF THE CDA AND ITS IMPORTANCE TO STUBHUB
To understand the effect of section 230 of the CDA on StubHub, this Part explains the Act's purpose, statutory text, and the courts' application of its key terms. 28 Section A of this Part discusses the undesirable outcome that results from applying offline notions of third-party liability to the Internet, prompting 19 See Hill, 727 S.E.2d Prior to the CDA, liability for Internet service providers of third-party content depended on offline notions of publishers versus distributors. 33 Under this distinction, publishers, such as newspapers, were liable for any defamatory comments they published and over which they had control. 34 In contrast, distributors, such as bookstores, were immune from liability if they had no knowledge of the defamatory material they circulated.
35 Thus, if a website or Internet forum exhibited control or knew of alleged defamatory statements, it became liable for those statements as a publisher.
36
The offline analogy of publishers and distributors encouraged online companies to refrain from monitoring the content their users posted. Roommates.com) . The point at which an interactive computer service also becomes an information content provider is the point at which the interactive community service loses immunity under the CDA. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1667-68; Doty, supra note 16, at 127-28; Weslander, supra . The district court noted that CompuServe lacked control over the content before being disseminated, and that imposing liability otherwise would result in ample, in 1995, in Stratton Oakmont, Inc. v. Prodigy Services Co. , the New York Supreme Court held that a host of an online bulletin board was liable for the defamatory statements of its user because it exercised editorial control.
38
Prodigy hosted a network of two million subscribers communicating over various topic-specific forums. 39 Prodigy marketed itself as a family-friendly service due to its editorial control, which was accomplished through automatic screening software and board leaders overseeing the content. 40 The court held that these actions made Prodigy a publisher and thus liable for the content its users post. 41 In this way, Prodigy's good faith efforts to monitor its bulletin boards resulted in liability. 42 In a response to the Stratton Oakmont decision, Congress passed section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. 43 Congress provided protection for websites in § 230 by unequivocally declaring them immune from civil liability for the content of a user as long as the website is not "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development" of that information. 44 The Act further grants immunity to any website that attempts to monitor and filter the content of its users. 45 This includes "any action voluntarily taken in good faith to re- REV. 347, 354-55 (2000) (describing the debate in Congress leading up to the enactment of the CDA).
44 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1) ("No provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider."). 45 Id. CDA immunity is not confined to defamation claims; rather, the immunity also applies to all civil claims. See, e.g., Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 38, 41-42 (Wash. Ct. App. 2001) (interpreting the applicability of the CDA to contract claims). The CDA also provides explicit exceptions as to criminal and intellectual property law. 47 U.S.C. § 230(e)(1)-(2). strict access to or availability of" objectionable material.
46 Section 230 of the CDA does not encourage websites to monitor, but simply removes the legal downside of monitoring.
47
Section 230 of the CDA distinguishes between "interactive computer services" and "information content providers," providing civil liability immunity to computer services, but not to information providers. 48 An interactive computer service means any host that enables computer access by multiple users to a computer server, like a website. 49 The term "interactive computer service" also incorporates the term "access software providers," which includes any website that offers functions that "filter, screen, allow, or disallow content . . . pick, choose, analyze, or digest content; or transmit, receive, display, forward, cache, search, subset, organize, reorganize, or translate content." 50 On the other hand, an "information content provider" is any person or entity that is "responsible, in whole or in part, for the creation or development of information."
51
The focus of litigation involving section 230 of the CDA is when an interactive computer service is simultaneously an information content provider, thus causing it to lose the immunity that the CDA provides. 52 Although it is clear when a website engages in the "creation" of information, defining what constitutes a website's "development" of information has been far more difficult.
53
Congress explained its findings and the policy reasons behind the CDA in the statutory text. 54 Congress intended to preserve the Internet as a robust medium for communication and to remove the disincentives for hosts to self-46 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(2)(B). 47 See id. § 230(b)(4), (c)(2)(B); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1163 ("In other words, Congress sought to immunize the removal of user-generated content, not the creation of content . . . ."); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 331 (explaining that in response to Stratton Oakmont, the CDA removes the disincentives to monitoring). 48 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f)(2)-(3). 49 Id. § 230(f)(2). 50 Id. § 230(f)(4). 51 Id. § 230(f)(3). Litigants argue that although a website is an interactive computer service, it is also an information content provider when it contributes to the information in part, thus losing CDA immunity. See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165-66 . 52 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1165-66; Carafano v. Metrosplash.com, Inc., 339 F.3d 1119 , 1123 (9th Cir. 2003 62 See Carafano, 339 F.3d at 1123 (explaining that CDA immunity has been applied broadly). In 1997, in Zeran v. American Online, Inc., the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that America Online ("AOL") was not the information content provider of alleged defamatory comments on an AOL bulletin board and thus immune from liability for the comments. 129 F.3d at 332-34. An unidentified user posted insensitive t-shirts for sale relating to the Oklahoma City bombing, with Zeran's information as the point of contact as a prank. See id. at 329. Zeran contacted AOL, who agreed to take the post down but would not post a retraction. See id. After AOL took down the information, it was immediately reposted, snowballing into harassment, death threats, and public humiliation for still receive CDA immunity. 63 Courts also rejected assigning liability even if a website received notice of alleged defamation because it would impose monitoring costs and burden websites, contrary to Congress's intent. 64 These courts took a hardline approach in protecting CDA immunity, noting that Congress chose to immunize an "active, even aggressive" role for interactive computer services.
65
In contrast to these broad views of CDA immunity, other courts applied a strict textual interpretation of the language "responsible . . . in part, for the . . . development" of the information and thereby limited CDA immunity.
66 In 2008, in Fair Housing Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com , LLC, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com was not immune from liability under the CDA. 67 Roommates.com connected people looking for roommates with those seeking vacancies.
68 Users were required to fill out a questionnaire asking their preferences as to a roommate's sex, sexual orientation, and renting to those with children.
69 Roommates.com then displayed these preferences and comments in the form of a user's profile page and provided a search function based on these preferences. 70 See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (noting that if an interactive computer service provider is dealt with a multitude of take-down notices, it will simply remove the content in question without examining the legality of the content because there is no liability for removing content, and in doing so will avoid monitoring costs). Requiring websites to monitor its users' content stifles the free flow of information. See Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333. 65 Drudge, 992 F. Supp. at 51-52 ("If it were writing on a clean slate, this Court would agree with plaintiffs. . . . But Congress has made a different policy choice by providing immunity even where the interactive service provider has an active, even aggressive role in making available content prepared by others."). In 1998, in Blumenthal v. Drudge, the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia held AOL immune from the defamatory comments written by Matthew Drudge on a popular gossip website called the "Drudge Report." Id. at 50-52. Drudge licensed the "Drudge Report" to AOL for $3000 per month. See id. at 51. Under the agreement, Drudge e-mailed AOL his articles, which AOL subsequently posted. See id. at 47. AOL reserved the right to remove and request changes to certain content that it deemed necessary. See id. AOL also advertised the availability of the Drudge Report as a draw for customers to sign up with AOL. See id. at 51. 66 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(3); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1167-69 (interpreting "development" to mean "materially contributing" to the alleged unlawfulness of the information). 67 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69, 75; Doty, supra note 16, at 129-31 . The point at which an interactive computer service also becomes an information content provider is the point at which the service loses immunity under the CDA. See Doty, supra note 16, at 127-28 (explaining the applicability of the CDA); Weslander supra note 16, at 279. 68 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1161. 69 Id. 70 Id. at 1161-62, 67.
("FHA"), which makes it illegal to rent housing or refuse to rent housing on the basis of race, gender, and familial status. 71 The Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com could be liable for its display of user preferences and their use of a search function based on those preferences because these actions constituted "development," in part, of information.
72
The Ninth Circuit announced a test for determining when an interactive computer service is also an information content provider, interpreting "development" of information to mean "materially contributing to its unlawfulness."
73 In adopting this test, the court looked towards Wikipedia for the definition of "web development," which included "gathering, organizing and editing information" in its definition.
74
The dissent criticized the majority for formulating a test related to the underlying claim of illegality because the issue of illegality is decided only after a website is deemed to be an information content provider. 75 The dissent argued that immunity should be determined by the degree to which the website contributed to the information, regardless of whether the information itself is illegal.
76
Moreover, the dissent expressed frustration with the majority's inconsistent and ambiguous language in its test for determining whether a website "materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness" of the content. 77 The dis- 71 Id. at 1162. The Fair Housing Act prohibits discriminatory or preferential rentals, or sales based on protected categories. 42 U.S.C. § 3604 (2012). 72 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1166-67, 1175. The Ninth Circuit also held that Roommates.com could be liable for the questions it poses because it is providing that information. Id. at 1164. Roommates.com also provided a comments box for users to write additional information. Id. at 1161. The Ninth Circuit held that Roommates.com is immune from liability for the additional comments section because it merely provided an open space for users. Id. at 1173-74. At this stage the Court only discarded CDA immunity, remanding for further consideration as to whether the content violated the FHA. Id. at 1175. 73 Id. at 1167-68 (interpreting development to mean "materially contributing to its alleged unlawfulness," such as contributing to the defamation); see Doty, supra note 16, at 129-31 (explaining the requirement test as a "solicitation" standard and the encouragement test as an "inducement" standard); Dyer supra note 16, at 845-46. 74 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69. The functions of gathering, organizing, and editing information are similar to the traditional publisher duties protected by the CDA. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (opining that the majority's definition of "web development" includes terms explicitly protected under the statute); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims that attempt to hold websites liable for traditional publisher functions are meritless). 75 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1182-83 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (noting that there is no reference to unlawfulness in the text of the CDA and thus the majority is conflating an issue of immunity with an issue of substantive liability). 76 See id. (noting that websites could be information content providers of harmless information, and the determination of illegality is made after the CDA analysis). 77 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1175 (stating that a website loses immunity for encouraging or requiring illegal content). In Judge McKeown's dissent he criticizes the majority for leaving websites "wondering where immunity ends and liability begins." Id. at 1176-77 (McKeown, J., dissent-sent observed how although the majority seemed to emphasize that Roommates.com required users to answer unlawful questions as a condition of service, throughout the opinion, the majority substituted "requirement" for words like "collaborate," "force," "design," "induce," "encourage," "elicit" and "urge."
78 To the dissent, the majority was ironically at its most ambiguous when it attempted to be the most clear, for the majority opinion stated: "the message to website operators is clear: if you don't encourage illegal content, or design your website to require users to input illegal content, you will be immune." 79 The Ninth Circuit's expansive definition of "information content provider" was novel, for a website's design could now make a company responsible in part for the development of its users' content. 80 Most courts have accepted the Roommates.com "material contribution" test for determining when a website "develops" information "in part."
81 Some have criticized the decision, however, arguing that it conflicts with Congress's broad grant of immunity.
82
Moreover, when determining CDA immunity under this framework, it is unclear whether encouragement or requirement is the standard. Under the umbrella of the "materially contributing to its unlawfulness" test from Roommates.com, courts have adopted two different approaches to ing). The majority stated that by "requiring" answers to its questions it loses CDA immunity as to that information. See id. at 1165 (majority opinion). The majority then uses words like "urge" and "encourage" to describe when the website loses immunity. See id. at 1173-74 (finding Roommates.com immune for the open-ended writing space of its users); Doty, supra note 16, at 130-31 (explaining the vagueness of the majority's holding in Roommates.com Doty, supra note 16, 136 ("Some language suggests that a Web site loses immunity by simply encouraging an illegal aspect of its user-generated content." (footnote omitted)); Dyer supra note 16, at 845-46. Apart from the outliers, a large majority of courts applying the CDA have granted immunity. Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 558 (noting only a "handful" of three-hundred reported decisions in federal and state courts have not granted immunity). 83 See 521 F.3d at 1176-77 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (characterizing the majority's opinion as a slippery slope); Dyer, supra note 16, at 844. determining when a website materially contributes to the information in question. 84 Some courts have held that if a website encourages users to produce illegal content, then it materially contributes to the illegal act, whereas other courts have applied a heightened standard that a website must require the information at issue in order to be held liable for its illegality. 85 Under the encouragement test, a website that encourages or induces illegal content, rather than employs "neutral tools," is considered a developer, in part, of that content. 86 Thus, if the website specifically encourages allegedly unlawful content, it is deemed an information content provider and loses immunity under § 230.
87 In 2009, in FTC v. Accusearch Inc. , the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit adopted this interpretation of the material contribution test.
88 There, the FTC brought an unfair trade practice claim against Accusearch, Inc. for selling confidential phone records. 89 Accusearch paid researchers to collect personal phone record information and advertised access to these confidential records. 90 The Tenth Circuit held that because Accusearch specifically encouraged requests for protected information and paid researchers to obtain the information, it materially contributed to the unlawfulness of that information and was therefore liable for it.
91
Under the encouragement test, a website will be responsible for the development of information if it has an "active role" and instructs users to post certain content.
92 In 2004, in MCW, Inc. v. Badbusinessbureau.com Badbusinessbureau.com, LLC, No. 3:02-CV-2727 -G, 2004 WL 833595, at *8-10 (N.D. Tex. Apr. 19, 2004 ) (interpreting development to mean "active role"); Doty, supra note 16, at 126, 136 . Tools are neutral "so long as users ultimately decide what content to post, such that the tool merely provides 'a framework that could be utilized for proper or improper purposes.'" Goddard v. Google, Inc., 640 F. Supp. 2d 1193 , 1997 -98 (N.D. Cal. 2009 Badbusinessbureau.com hosted a consumer complaint forum that enabled customers to get revenge for unsatisfactory experiences through public web-posts and class action lawsuits. 94 Additionally, an operator of Badbusinessbureau.com emailed users, directing them to gather photos and collect detailed information. 95 This encouragement was enough for the district court to hold that Badbusinessbureau.com was a developer of the content and thus not immune under the CDA.
96
Other courts have held that encouragement is not enough to find that a website operator materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness of information and is thus responsible for the development of it.
97 These courts narrowly interpret the Roommates.com "materially contributing to its unlawfulness" test, emphasizing that the requirement of the questionnaire as a condition of service was essential to that holding. 98 Compared to the encouragement test, the requirement test is more likely to lead to immunity under section 230 of the CDA.
99 These courts rely heavily on Congress's explicit policy choice in section 230 of the CDA to provide robust immunity to websites, regardless of ethical considerations.
100
Under this test, a website will lose its CDA immunity and be responsible for allegedly illegal content only if it requires users to post that content. propose that stricter limitations on retaining CDA immunity will provide fairer legal remedies for victims of cyber harassment and revenge pornography, among other civil violations.
108 Some alternate tests include accepting an encouragement or inducement standard for determining contributory liability, or demanding the content to be removed upon request.
109

C. Modern Marketplaces: StubHub and Its Reliance on the CDA
Capturing the inefficiency of supply and demand pricing on the primary ticket market, StubHub allows consumers to buy or resell tickets on the secondary market.
110 For a sold-out event, a customer can go to the secondary market and pay a premium price over face value. 111 Conversely, for an event in which the primary vendor's price exceeds demand, a lower price can be found on the secondary market.
112
StubHub provides an easy interface for sellers to list tickets to an event.
113
The service allows sellers to upload tickets and input detailed information regarding the quantity, section, row, seat number, and various other features or commerce service). The concerns are primarily ones of privacy and harassment, but extend to any civil claim. See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689-90 (arguing for a "specific encouragement" standard for CDA immunity); Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for a Grokster " 108 See Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689-90; Locke, supra note 58, at 159 (calling for a stricter standard when applying CDA immunity); Logiurato, supra note 107 (detailing New York's struggle to regulate Airbnb because of the protection that the CDA provides); Bolson, supra note 107 (arguing that changes are needed to the CDA because the Internet has grown in ways Congress did not originally foresee). 109 Bluebond, supra note 57, at 689-90 (arguing for a "specific encouragement" standard for CDA immunity); Locke supra note 58, at 159 (arguing for an inducement standard); Bolson, supra note 107 (arguing for a notice and take-down process). 110 See Rovell, supra note 6; Cassidy, supra note 6 (explaining how StubHub works 115 StubHub also conducts a "LargeSellers" program where it offers fee discounts for high-volume sellers. 116 The LargeSellers program also gives the high-volume sellers an exclusive opportunity to buy underpriced tickets, and a chance to resell them at a higher price.
117
In its user agreement, StubHub makes it clear that it does not own or control user data. 118 The agreement places the responsibility of listing tickets on the seller and requires any listing to be in accordance with the law.
119 According to the agreement, the user owns any content submitted, granting StubHub the right to use it freely.
120
Although originally applied to defamation suits, CDA immunity applies to all civil liability.
121 Faced with anti-scalping law claims and business torts, StubHub and other peer-to-peer online marketplaces depend on § 230 immunity to shield their business models from liability. (2), (e)(3) (stating that CDA immunity applies to all civil liability and is not limited to tort claims); Schneider, 31 P.3d at 41-42 (holding that the CDA extends beyond defamation to any civil claim besides the exceptions enumerated in the statutory text). 122 See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 485 (defending a claim for tortious interference with advantageous relations based on liability for a seller's violation of anti-scalping law while using the website); see also Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based on liability for a seller's violation of anti-scalping law while using the website). Although the practice of ticket scalping, especially online, is trending largely towards deregulation, there are still state laws in place that prohibit the resale of tickets above face value. See Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26. Massachusetts legislators are proposing bills to repeal their anti-scalping laws. See Lewontin, supra note 13 (noting that repealing current anti-scalping law would harmonize the law with the current state of the secondary ticket market The Patriots alleged that StubHub interfered with their agreement with season ticket holders, which included a non-transferability clause. 131 To show that StubHub interfered with its agreement by "improper means," a necessary ele- 123 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1171-72 (noting that, in close cases, websites should be granted immunity in line with Congress's intent, or else websites will face "death by ten thousand duck-bites"); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 553 (defending a claim for unfair or deceptive trade practices based on liability for a seller's violation of anti-scalping law while using the website Adopting a variation of the encouragement test, the Superior Court of Massachusetts in NPS held that StubHub materially contributed to ticket scalping because it induced others to violate the law. 133 In denying summary judgment, the court discussed how StubHub's pricing structure indicated it profited from above face value tickets and failed to disclose the face value of tickets. 134 StubHub's handbook encouraged "LargeSellers" to buy underpriced tickets, implying they could resell them for a higher price. 135 In addition, StubHub provided the option for LargeSellers to "mask" their exact ticket location, making it hard for the Patriots to determine which season ticket holders are selling on StubHub.
136 According to the court, this inducement or "knowing participation" amounted to material contribution towards illegal ticket-scalping 138 In that case, a buyer used StubHub to purchase Hannah Montana concert tickets that exceeded the face value price by roughly three times. 139 The buyer then brought suit alleging that StubHub was responsible for the development of the ticket price, violating North Carolina's antiscalping law.
Adopting the heightened standard that encouragement of illegal content is not enough to lose immunity, the Court of Appeals of North Carolina held that a website must "effectively control" the content or "ensure the creation" of it to be liable. 141 Explicitly declining to follow the test set forth in NPS, the court interpreted the CDA and relevant case law to provide a broad grant of immunity. 142 Faced with similar facts as in NPS, the court held that encouragement or inducement of market-based prices above face value does not constitute development of actual price information. 143 Also, unlike the court in NPS, the court held that knowledge of illegal content does not automatically remove a website's CDA immunity.
144
B. Determining StubHub's CDA Immunity Based on Knowledge of, or Willful Blindness Towards, Ticket-Scalping
A major difference in the holdings in NPS and Hill is the importance of knowledge as a factor for determining a website's CDA immunity. 145 In NPS, the Superior Court of Massachusetts considered StubHub's increased profit from above face value ticket prices and fee waivers for LargeSellers to resell underpriced tickets at a higher price.
146 According to the court, StubHub knowingly induced illegal conduct. 147 The court held that knowledge or willful blindness of illegal conduct constitutes "materially contributing to its unlawfulness."
148 Directly counter to the holding in NPS, the court in Hill held that StubHub is not an information content provider and retains immunity even if it knows of unlawful conduct by its users.
149
Factual differences in NPS and Hill may have led the NPS court to put more weight on StubHub's knowledge as a factor for immunity. 150 In Hill, a one-time buyer filed a complaint against his seller and StubHub. 151 In this transaction only StubHub's basic middleman services were in question, including its guarantee, fees, and shipping services. 152 Conversely, in NPS, the New England Patriots sought an injunction against StubHub prohibiting any resale of Patriots tickets. 153 This larger scale assault on StubHub's practices detailed its incentive program for "LargeSellers" and "masking" tool, limiting the Patriots' ability to identify season ticket resellers.
154 These features painted a picture of StubHub's willful blindness towards its users' conduct.
155
The holding in NPS, that knowledge is sufficient to "materially contribute" to illegal conduct, is unprecedented.
156 Although the opinion in Roommates.com may be unclear as to what exactly constitutes "material contribution" to illegal content, there is no reference to knowledge in the Ninth Circuit's holding or dicta. 157 In fact, the 154 See id. at 480. The court held that the masking ability was not sufficient to succeed on a common law misrepresentation claim because the seller did not mask any information from the buyer, just the Patriots. See id. at 482. 155 See id. at 482-85 (holding that willful blindness is not compatible with CDA immunity). 157 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1164-70 (not considering knowledge as a factor for immunity). Liability upon notice or knowledge contradicts the CDA's purpose. Zeran, 129 F.3d at 333 (describing the negative effects that notice liability would have on interactive service providers). 158 See Grokster, 545 U.S. at 930; NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482-83; Doty, supra note 16, at 137-38 (noting that the inducement test from Grokster influenced the NPS decision). Even if knowledge is relevant for liability, StubHub simply knows the market prices, driven by the forces of supply and demand. See Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 561; Goldman, supra note 124 (explaining that StubHub is simply concerned with market price); Schroeder, supra note 2, at 26 (explaining the basic concept of supply and demand). Imputing liability from StubHub's price-dependent revenue model expands liability to new levels for CDA jurisprudence and potentially puts e-commerce websites at risk. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482-83 (holding StubHub liable for inducing the price in question); Doty, supra note 16, at 138-39 (describing the inducement test as a departure from previously narrow rulings). The court used the "inducement" standard, taken from contributory liability for copyright infringement in the Grokster case. See NPS, 25 Mass. L. Rptr. at 482-83; Doty, supra note 16, at . But see Locke, supra note 58, at 168 (arguing for an "inducement" test derived from Grokster).
leaves the door open for rogue decisions like NPS and results in uncertainty for StubHub.
159
C. CDA Uncertainty Threatens the Growth of StubHub and Other Peer-to-Peer Marketplaces
If StubHub is uncertain as to whether it will receive immunity, it may tailor its practices towards a less interactive experience, stunting growth. 160 Congress enacted the CDA, in part, to give websites peace of mind with immunity. 161 As a result of these split decisions, StubHub's uncertainty as to its immunity is tantamount to having no immunity at all. 162 In addition, rising legal fees for potential liability could stunt growth, contrary to Congress's goals. 163 The CDA serves as a procedural device at the motion to dismiss stage, allowing websites to stave off discovery costs if granted immunity. 164 Potential liability for facilitating peer-to-peer transactions threatens not only StubHub, but all online marketplaces that rely on CDA immunity for innovation. 165 Companies such as Uber and Airbnb provide ancillary services, acting as the middlemen connecting drivers and riders, and homeowners and travelers. 166 The users of these online marketplaces are increasingly looking for more data-driven and interactive user experiences and are moving away from a Craigslist.org white-pages approach. 167 But, when courts impose liability on these interactive marketplaces, they encourage the services to be more like a barebones Craigslist. 168 If legal liability outweighs the revenue benefits from interactive peer-to-peer tools, the growth of marketplaces like StubHub could be halted, depriving consumers of new e-commerce. 169 This likely conflicts with Congress's policy to limit government intervention and promote the growth of the Internet. 168 See Zeran, (describing Congress's intent in enacting the CDA and the negative effects on interactive service providers if Congress's goals are not upheld); Hill, 727 S.E.2d at 559 (noting that the pricing tools and features are neutral tools). Notably, Craigslist has had definitive success under the CDA. See Dart v. Craigslist, Inc., 665 F. Supp. 2d 961, 969 (N.D. Ill. 2009 ) (holding that the plaintiffs could pursue a public nuisance claim against Craigslist users who solicited prostitution, but not against Craigslist itself). 169 See Geron, supra note 167 (explaining that despite facing regulatory challenges, the sharing economy generated approximately $3.5 billion in revenue in 2013); Hanna, supra note 167; Logiurato, supra note 107 (noting Airbnb's reliance on the CDA immunity for the offering its ecommerce service); Miller, supra note 165 (describing CDA immunity as one of the foundational principles to the middleman economy); Jeffries, supra note 167. 170 In its findings and policy in the text of the CDA, Congress explicitly recognized the Internet's increasingly important role in our society. 176 The Internet increases the flow of information between its users and has allowed people to create communicative forums with user control.
177 In order to promote and preserve these benefits, Congress called for minimum government regulation.
178
Otherwise, when faced with liability and high monitoring costs, websites would simply limit user content at the outset, chilling speech.
179 Therefore, Congress severely limited website liability for its users' content.
180 CDA immunity is not, however, absolute.
181 A website will not be immune when it is actually an "information content provider" itself, meaning that it is responsible for "in whole or 173 See infra notes The Congress finds the following: (1) The rapidly developing array of Internet and other interactive computer services available to individual Americans represent an extraordinary advance in the availability of educational and informational resources to our citizens. (2) These services offer users a great degree of control over the information that they receive, as well as the potential for even greater control in the future as technology develops.
Id.
179 See Zeran, (explaining that websites would not inquire into the merit of take-down notices, and simply remove content upon request, thus chilling speech). 180 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(a)-(c); Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330-31. The CDA has been interpreted to apply beyond just defamation cases. See Schneider v. Amazon.com, Inc., 31 P.3d 38, 41, 42 (2001) (holding that CDA immunity is not limited to tort claims and finding the defendant immune from a breach of contract claim). 181 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Fair Hous. Council of San Fernando Valley v. Roommates.com, LLC, 521 F.3d 1157 , 1167 -68 (9th Cir. 2008 ) (holding that an interactive computer service loses immunity if it "materially contributes to the alleged unlawfulness" of the content). in part . . . the creation or development" of information.
182 Since the CDA's enactment, courts have struggled to determine what the term "development means in this context. 183 On the one hand it can mean "to make something new," or more broadly it can mean "to make something available." 184 In Roommates.com, the Ninth Circuit looked towards Wikipedia for the definition of "web development," finding it most relevant to the context of the CDA. 185 But, courts should not rely on this definition of web development because this definition encompasses traditional publisher duties that are explicitly protected by the CDA, such as "gathering, organizing and editing information." 186 Because "development" can be stretched in different ways, the term should be interpreted in accordance with legislative intent.
187 The statute's explicit findings and policy clearly show that Congress intended to immunize websites from liability.
188 Strictly interpreting the term "development" in line with Congress's intent leads to website immunity unless the website actually 182 See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c), (f); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1162-63 (explaining how a website operator can be both a service provider and a content provider).
183 See Hill v. StubHub, Inc., 727 S.E.2d 550, (N.C. Ct. App. 2012) (explaining that the vast majority of courts interpreting the CDA have held in favor of immunity); Doty, supra note 16, at 128 (noting that the majority of litigation around CDA immunity is about when an interactive computer service is also an information content provider so as to be responsible for the information). Unlike the clear findings and policy of Congress, the definition of "information content provider" is vague. See Shiamili v. Real Estate Grp. of N.Y., Inc., 952 N.E.2d 1011, 1017 (N.Y. 2011); Doty supra note 16, at 126 (noting that the bulk of litigation concerns what constitutes "development" of information by an interactive computer service). In tackling the definition of "development" in part, some courts have looked towards the dictionary definition. See FTC v. Accusearch, Inc., 570 F.3d 1187 , 1197 -99 (10th Cir. 2009 Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69 (looking to Wikipedia for the definition of "web development"). Yet the dictionary does not provide a consensus because "development" has many meanings. See Accusearch, 570 F.3d at 1197-98 (construing two dictionary definitions of "develop"); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69 (disagreeing with the dissent on the correct definition for "develop"). 184 See Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69 . 185 See id. 186 Id.; see 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1180, 1186 (McKeown, J., dissenting) (explaining that the majority's definition of "web development" encompasses the type of functions that are explicitly associated with interactive computer services and protected under the statute); see also Zeran, 129 F.3d at 330 (stating that claims attempting to hold websites liable for traditional publisher functions are meritless). These traditional publisher functions include analyzing, reorganizing, and filtering data. See 47 U.S.C. § 230(f)(4); Roommates.com, 521 F.3d at 1168-69; id. at 1180 id. at , 1186 provides the content itself.
189 But because the statute also included the terms "responsible" for, and "creation," it would be redundant to interpret "development" to mean "to make something new." 190 Therefore, courts should interpret "development" to mean "require," for such a definition ensures that the term "create" retains meaning while also providing broad immunity and protecting e-commerce growth. 191 Largely overlooked, the plain language of the CDA provides further insight into what types of activities should be immunized. 192 The CDA definition of "interactive computer service" incorporates the term "access software provider." 193 The term "access software provider" is separately defined and includes any website that utilizes tools that "filter . . . analyze . . . digest . . . [or] reorganize" content. 194 These actions are thus functions of an interactive computer service and are protected by the CDA. 195 Under the plain language of the CDA, any attempt to assign liability for filtering or reorganizing data is misplaced.
196
As the central function of marketplaces is to reorganize user data, CDA immunity should extend to StubHub, Uber, Airbnb, and all marketplaces in line with a proper interpretation of the Act's plain language. 197 StubHub's pric-ing recommendation tool compiles historical sales data, showing the low, average, and high prices for similar tickets. 198 According to the CDA, reorganizing user data is not "developing" the information in part, but rather a protected action of an "interactive computer service". 199 Finally, in order to further Congress's policy goals, StubHub and other peer-to-peer marketplaces should be protected under the CDA. 200 Congress sought to encourage the growth of the Internet through unfettered speech and limited liability. 201 Placing liability on these marketplaces imposes exorbitant monitoring costs and defeats the purpose of an interactive middleman service. 202 Without CDA immunity, flourishing companies that offer tremendous value to customers and the economy may not exist as they currently do. 203 
B. Moving On: Deconstructing the Roommates.com Test to Eliminate Ambiguity
Despite the shortcomings of the Roommates.com "material contribution" test, many courts rely on it to determine when a website "develops" infor-mation "in part," losing immunity. 204 Courts diverge, however, as to whether encouragement of information or requirement of information precludes immunity. 205 In order to provide predictability for websites going forward, courts must reach consistent judgments on CDA immunity. 206 This section argues that if courts are to use the Roommates.com "material contribution" test, they should use a requirement approach. 207 This section then applies this approach to StubHub's practices. 208 The Roommates.com "material contribution" test should be interpreted to mean that a website loses immunity if it requires unlawful content as opposed to encouraging or having knowledge of content. 209 Despite its sporadic references to a broader standard, the majority in Roommates.com based its holding on the fact that Roommates.com required unlawful content as a condition of service. 210 The holding was a direct response to the thrust of the Fair Housing Council's claims, that Roommates.com is not immune for requiring its users to violate the law. 211 If courts continue to use the Roommates.com test, they should discard immunity only when a website requires content because this approach strikes the right balance between protecting innovation and limiting CDA immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content. 212 Although the CDA should not overly protect invasive and abusive uses of the Internet, such as revenge pornography and cyberbullying, there are other laws in place that pro-vide legal remedies to such victims. 213 Moreover, because the CDA exempts from its reach any criminal law claim or intellectual property claim, a website cannot assert the CDA as an affirmative defense when met with claims of these types. 214 Additionally, CDA immunity is strictly about vicarious liability; the victim still has the opportunity to seek recourse against the user who violated the law. 215 If a website requires illegal conduct, it will be responsible through vicarious liability, but any more relaxed standard potentially chills innovation and free speech. 216 An encouragement or inducement standard can always be manipulated to impose liability on a website for having some influence on a user's content. 217 This "but-for" analysis will cause websites and their users to be "joined at the hip" for legal liability. 218 Instead, courts should discard CDA immunity only if the website requires the content. 219 Applying this interpretation of the Roommates.com holding, StubHub should retain immunity under the CDA because it does not require users to post illegal content. 220 StubHub's LargeSellers program involving fee waivers and location masking is not a requirement as a condition of service. 221 Whereas the Roommates.com discriminatory questionnaire and answers automatically violated the FHA, StubHub's users can still price their tickets under face value if they choose. 222 StubHub's suggested pricing tool is based on market prices, not face value prices, and ultimately allows sellers to enter any price they wish. 223 Additionally, the CDA definition of a protected "interactive computer service" includes any tools that "filter . . . analyze . . . [or] organize" content. 224 Thus, StubHub's display of its user data into a market-based pricing tool is explicitly protected. The Roommates.com test may be the most commonly used approach to determining CDA immunity, but it is fundamentally flawed and should be abandoned. 226 Focusing on the alleged unlawfulness when determining CDA immunity is the wrong inquiry. 227 Determining whether a website has "materially contributed to the alleged unlawfulness" requires an analysis into the cause of action. 228 Yet, the CDA simply focuses on information and whether that information can be attributed to the website, regardless of its alleged unlawfulness. 229 Determining immunity by whether a website has "materially contributed" to the unlawfulness collapses two distinct questions of information development and substantive liability. 230 At the motion to dismiss stage, unlawfulness has not yet been determined. 231 A new test for immunity should focus solely on how a website contributes to the information of a third party, regardless of the content's alleged unlawfulness. 232 The CDA says nothing about alleged unlawfulness, but simply focuses on whether the information in question can be attributed to the website. 233 The ineffectiveness of the Roommates.com test's focus on alleged unlawfulness can be highlighted by a simple example. 234 If a website requires a user to post harmless information, like what the weather is like outside, it is immune. 235 But, if a website requires a user to answer discriminatory questions violating the FHA, it is not immune. 236 In either scenario, the website has "developed" the information "in part" by requiring that information and thus fits the definition of an "information content provider," but only one of the websites is immune. 237 CDA immunity should not depend on the alleged unlawfulness of the information, but should instead be based on whether the website is an "information content provider," as the statute clearly sets out. 238 
D. A Clear Act Guaranteeing the Production of the Content
A new test is needed to eliminate the ambiguity left by the Roommates.com "material contribution" test. 239 A website should lose CDA immunity only when it takes a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content. 240 This proposed test cements Congress's policy to protect free-flowing information and Internet growth while also discarding website immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content. 241 If a website writes the content itself, it is responsible for the "creation" of that content. 242 If a website takes some other clear act guaranteeing the production of content, it directly causes that content and is responsible for the "development" of that content.
243
Interpreting "development" to mean "a clear act guaranteeing its production" more clearly delineates between immunity and liability. 244 Examples of clear acts guaranteeing the production of content include requiring content, but also sponsoring it, paying for it, or mandating it through a user agreement. 245 When a website commits a clear act of this kind it loses its immunity because Congress enacted the CDA to protect websites from third-party liability, not from a website's own conduct. 246 By discarding CDA immunity for certain acts beyond just requiring content, this test strikes a balance for those concerned with privacy and harassment. 247 Conversely, this test protects the plain language definition of "access software provider" because filtering or reorganizing data does not guarantee the creation of user content. 248 Finally, this test continues to disregard knowledge as a factor because the CDA was intended to remove the monitoring costs stemming from liability upon knowledge. 249 Under this test, a marketplace like StubHub will unambiguously be protected under the CDA because it does not commit a clear act guaranteeing the production of the content. 250 StubHub does not require the price to be above face value or pay users to post prices above face value, nor does it mandate it through its user agreement. 251 StubHub's LargeSellers program involving fee waivers and location masking is optional, and does not guarantee a user will price above face value. 252 StubHub's reorganization of its users' data is explicitly protected under the CDA.
253 Any knowledge of a user's scalping violation is irrelevant under CDA analysis because it imposes exorbitant monitoring costs, contrary to Congress's intent. 254 This test strikes the right balance between protecting innovation and limiting CDA immunity when the website is truly responsible for the content. 255 CDA jurisprudence is predictable for most interactive computer services, yet it must be predictable for peer-to-peer marketplaces as well to protect growth and innovation. 256 
